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Abstract 
Demand side management (DSM) in smart grid paradigm is an energy management strategy of the grid using 
advanced data communication and networking. The aggregator, a third party entity, is appearing as a key player 
in managing the demand during the peak hours between the utility and the consumer. In this work, a general 
framework is discussed and focuses on the interactional issues between the utility, the aggregator and the 
consumers. The paper also discusses the role of communication in the context of interaction among the three 
players. In addition, it also presents the model of the framework which can enable the consumer to effectively 
participate in the DSM. The proposed model considers the direct load control (DLC) program which uses the 
concept of demand reduction bid (DRB) in aggregated demand response. 
Keywords: Aggregator, Demand reduction bid (DRB), Direct load control (DLC), Framework   
 
1. Introduction 
The increase in consumption of energy resources have highlighted the importance of energy saving across the 
globe. In past, the main source of energy have been fossil fuel. Therefore, now sustainable energy technologies 
are poised to become an integral part of the energy supply chain in order to cope the skyrocketing energy 
demand. Various countries are planning and developing strategies and giving incentives to public for the 
promotion and development of sustainable energy projects [1]. It has been recognized that investments in Peak 
Power Demand Management such as load curtailment programs could be significantly more cost effective than 
building new power plants to supply the peak demand load [2], [3].  
Researchers have identified significance of demand response in demand-side management program and 
consequently have presented many scheduling algorithms and formulated policies and strategies for demand-side 
management [4], [5]. However, in the emerging electric power market structures, there are opportunities for 
third-party aggregators to provide demand side services to multiple consumers. The aggregated response of these 
can have a significant effect on the power demand if the consumers are willing and committed to load reduction 
programs [6]. 
Till today, the implementation of aggregated demand response across the distribution and transmission network 
have not been addressed in the details. This paper develops the design of a framework for enormous consumers 
and the ways to model it. Section II presents the general design of the framework. Section III of the paper 
discusses the interaction between the utility and the aggregator and Section IV discusses the interaction between 
the aggregator and the consumers. Section V presents the communication strategy for the framework. Section VI 
proposes a model of the framework for implementation. Finally, section VII concludes the paper. 
 
2. Design of Framework 
The paper proposes a framework for the main implementation issues: the interaction of the aggregator with the 
consumer and utility, communication/control network and the design of an incentive program. The aim is to form 
a proper and effective DLC strategy and to be able to control dispatchable loads when needed. The key players in 
this framework are the consumers, the aggregator and the utility as shown in Fig. 1. In the following sections, the 
role and responsibilities of all three players is discussed along with their nature of interaction and possible 
communication strategy among each other. 
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Figure 1 Framework 
3. Utility and Aggregator 
Till today, there is no precise definition for the aggregator. But, in general, aggregator is an energy service 
provider between the utility and the consumers. The aggregator has an objective to shave the peak demand as 
well as support the utility in supplying uninterrupted and high quality power to commercial, industrial, 
institutional and domestic as well as electric vehicles during peak hours with ancillary services [7].  
As, it would be very demanding for the utility to directly communicate and control data and information from 
thousands of consumers. Therefore, the Utility sees the aggregator as a large consumer and an important factor in 
the smart distribution network. There can be two types of interaction between the utility and the aggregators 
which are discussed below; 
3.1 Mutual Interaction 
Aggregator can act as a retailer that buys electrical energy at the day-ahead energy market and the utility also 
makes an ex-ant validation regarding the price bid by the aggregator. On the other hand, the utility provides 
information and expected demand curve in advance for a particular peak period to the aggregator. 
3.2 Directed Interaction 
In other case, utility directs the aggregator that it has to curtail certain bulk of power whenever it requires. For 
this service, it would be rewarded by the utility. So, one of the issue in this kind of agreement is that what would 
be the rewarding mechanism? Because the utility may pay a fixed reward to aggregator against its services or 
this reward could be based on any dynamic pricing model like time-of-use, critical peak pricing etc. 
Nevertheless, most of the business models either proposed by the researchers or implemented by the utilities 
stand on bilateral contract with dynamic pricing model based on critical peak pricing [8], [9]. 
3.3 Contractual Matters 
Contracts between the utility and the aggregator may be bilateral or unilateral. If the contract is bilateral, then it 
is an agreement in which the utility promises to pay the aggregator and in exchange the aggregator promises to 
curtail the identified power. It means both parties i.e. utility and aggregator are contractual bound to obey the 
terms and conditions of the agreement. However, if it is a unilateral contract, then only utility might promise to 
pay the aggregator if it curtails the identified power. It means that aggregator is not under any obligation to 
curtail the identified power, but utility is under an obligation to pay a reward to aggregator if it does the job. 
For reference, PG&E has started non-tariff program named “Aggregator Managed Portfolio program” according 
to which it signs bilateral contracts with aggregators by which it may call power curtailment events during high-
price periods, emergencies and tests with price-responsive pricing mechanism [10]. 
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4. Aggregator and Consumer 
After the advent of Domotics, the controlling of home appliances become easier and cost effective [11], [12]. 
Therefore, nowadays the aggregator and the consumers can easily interact with each other. On the other side, 
aggregator has to control the load of the consumers by developing systematic control strategy such that it achieve 
the win-win condition i.e. maximize its own revenue, minimize utility’s operational cost and provide incentives 
to the consumers. Since long it has been an issue for the aggregator to attract the consumers for demand side 
management (DSM) and retain them. Therefore, lot of effort has been made by the aggregators in order to attract 
and motivate the consumers such that they allow aggregator to directly control their dispatchable loads during 
the peak hours. Thus, the interaction between the aggregator and consumer can be classified into the following 
three types: 
4.1 Direct load control (DLC) 
DLC is a conventional demand side management technique according to which the load is controlled by the 
aggregator at any time but in exchange consumer is not rewarded at all [13], [14]. Because of this DLC was not 
considered as a successful DSM technique and was not appreciated by the consumer. 
4.2 Price based control 
Currently, many aggregators are providing price-based manual or automated DLC programs to their consumers. 
By this strategy, consumer may be rewarded in many different ways, among these the most common reward is 
that consumer would gain fixed price against the load reduction. On the other hand, most of the aggregators are 
offering dynamic pricing mechanism and thus the consumer would be rewarded with the price based on real time 
electricity market [15], [16]. 
4.3 Incentive based control 
However, very few researches considered incentive-based program for the aggregator such as energy bidding 
pricing model [17], [18]. Indeed it could be an opportunity for developing nations that are currently either 
planning for or implementing the smart network, to consider incentive-based DLC model for commercial and 
domestic level. Because, incentive-based pricing mechanism effectively caters the social issues like consumer 
satisfaction and privacy than price-based methods and it also enables consumers to directly interact with energy 
market by bidding against their power curtailment. The implementation of aggregated demand response with 
these new features will attract a large number of consumers to perform demand response and gain full benefit 
from it without altering their life style and personal space. 
4.4 Contractual matters 
Similarly, contracts between consumers and aggregator may be bilateral or unilateral. If it is a bilateral contract, 
then it is an agreement in which the aggregator promises to pay the incentive to the consumer and in exchange 
the consumer promises to switch off or regulate the specific loads to reduce the required consumption. However, 
if it is a unilateral contract, then only aggregator promises to pay the incentive to the consumer if it switches off 
or regulates it’s load. It means that the consumer is not under an obligation to control the load, but the aggregator 
is under an obligation to pay a reward to the consumer if it shuts the loads. 
Most of the contracts implemented by the aggregators or proposed by the researchers for either European, 
Scandinavia or North America consumers are bilateral contracts because unilateral contracts mainly support the 
indirect load management strategy which may result in uncertainty and severance during the time of 
contingency. However, bilateral contracts provide provisions for a variety of load management strategies i.e. 
indirect, automatic and direct load control.  
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It can be inferred that most of the literature developed the business model of aggregator with price-responsive 
mechanism and thus it is easier to implement it for those nations who have already implemented smart network 
at their domestic level [19], [20]. 
 
5. Communication Strategy for Interaction between the Players 
The bi-directional communication networking of the smart grid infrastructure enables many demand response 
(DR) technologies, which control hundreds or thousands of distributed energy resources over vast geographic 
areas [21]–[24]. There are a number of communication access methods that can be used for the data transfer 
between the distributed consumers, aggregator and the utility. Wireless communication net-working is a capable 
option having a wide-coverage area and low installation and maintenance cost. But the consistency and 
dependability of wireless communication is to be understood; since, Demand response systems requires repeated 
exchange of data among the end devices and the aggregator, so the quality of the wireless communication is one 
of the major factors that needs to be taken care of. 
How to design, implement, and practically integrate efficient communication infrastructures with power systems 
towards an operable, cost-efficient, and backward-compatible communication solution, such a fundamental 
question should be elaborated in all critical aspects, including detailed communication requirements, system 
reliability as well as satisfactory system performance [25]. The major issue while deploying a communication 
network is to select the network design topology on the basis of which a wireless network infrastructure is 
constructed using a single or a multi-hop architecture design technique. The optimal routing topology can be 
selected by running simulations on a hypothetical DLC model using different routing algorithms. 
The ZigBee technology can also be used for communication between the dispatchable loads and the central 
controller of the consumer. Because ZigBee offers very low costs and a very high flexibility (up to 65,000 
devices can be added to the same network). While, communications between the consumer and the aggregator 
may have secure Internet link or EDGE technology. 
 
6. Modelling of the Framework 
In this section framework is modelled and presented for an implementation by the aggregator. This proposed 
model suggests the directed interaction between the aggregator and the utility. However, on the other hand, the 
aggregator will follow the concept of demand reduction bidding (DRB) as an incentive based program for the 
consumers. In this program, the aggregator and the consumers mutually sign the bilateral contract, by which the 
aggregator can curtail the power of the consumers during the peak period and in exchange it is bound to pay the 
bid price identified by the consumer and also satisfy the other constraints. 
Now, assume there are N number of consumers which are in contract with the aggregator and agreed to 
participate in the DRB based incentive program. For instance, assume any nth consumer out of N consumers 
which has identified D loads having ratings 𝑅𝑛. Moreover, in this framework which presents the demand 
reduction bid based incentive program for consumers, where consumer also identifies bids to decommit each 
dispatchable load during a control interval |H| which is denoted by 𝑄𝑛. Depending on the importance of each 
load, consumer should specify 𝑄𝑛 because by this consumer will be able to translate its “Desire of Use” of 
appliance. On the other hand, over expected load utilization and curtailment capability of every dispatchable 
load, the consumer also provide “duration constraints” that are 𝑇𝑂𝑛
𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑛  i.e the minimum durations for which each 
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load of nth consumer must be ON continuously, 𝑇𝑂𝑓𝑓
𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥  i.e. the maximum duration for which each load could be 
OFF continuously and 𝑇𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 i.e. the total durations for which each load of nth consumer can participate in load 
reduction. Thus, the introduction of these “consumer constraints” will not motivate the 
< 𝑄𝑛 ,  𝑅𝑛, 𝑇𝑂𝑛
𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑇𝑂𝑓𝑓
𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑛 ,  𝑇𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
> n=1……..N 
consumer to participate in the program but also try to achieve the consumer’s satisfaction, privacy and security. 
For an explanation of this modelling, assume an example of a consumer who signed an agreement with the 
aggregator for the 5 dispatchable loads {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}. Moreover, at the time of deal, consumer identified 
bidding and timing constraints as shown in Table I. Each of the consumer have a specified < 𝑄1 ,  𝑅1,𝑇𝑂𝑛
1𝑚𝑖𝑛, 
𝑇𝑂𝑓𝑓
1𝑚𝑖𝑛 ,  𝑇1
𝑚𝑎𝑥
> n=1 for each device which they have decide as per there convenience and consent. 
It can be inferred that demand side bidding does not only motivate the consumers to participate but it also 
portrays it’s ‘Desire of Use”. For instance, it can also be observed from Table I that for consumer 1, d3 might be 
significant enough that he/she bid high for this load. Similarly, consumer 1 bid least to its d5. In addition, the 
given duration constraints and bidding prices for each load also help the consumers in completely translating 
their needs and wants. For instance, in the given Table each load has some time bounds which the aggregator has 
to follow while turning the load on or off. For instance, for consumer 1, the maximum time for which the load d3 
can be turned off for maximum of 20 mins continuously. Although, after turning d3 on, the minimum time it has 
to be continuously on is 35 mins, it means that after turning it on, the aggregator has to wait for a minimum of 35 
mins to again turn it off. One more timing constraint is the total time that a particular load can be turned off 
during a complete day. As shown in Table I, d3 has the total maximum off time of 2 hours i.e. it can be turned off 
for a total of 2 hours. 
Furthermore, it can also observed that the maximum off time for the load d2 is merely 5 mins which signifies its 
importance to the consumer. Also, d2 has a significantly greater continuous on time as compared to other loads 
while the total maximum off time is only 30 mins i.e. the aggregator can only turn it off for just 30 mins in a day. 
Now, coming to the pricing, load d2 has the highest bid among all the dispatchable loads, it suggests that d2 is of 
critical importance to the consumer and the consumer discourages the aggregator to curtail this load repeatedly. 
However, in the condition of greater power shortage, the aggregator can turn d2 off despite of its high bid price 
and lower total off time. 
Thus, in short, these constraints collectively able to achieve the following functions: 
 Consumer motivation (by Demand Side Bidding) 
 Consumer desire of use and satisfaction constraints (by Duration Constrains). 
 Energy Payback Effect 
 
Energy payback effect can be easily caters by the duration constraints such that at the time of the deal aggregator 
will ex-ant these duration constraints by the help of define load models so as while controlling they cause less 
energy payback effect. Moreover, they will also know the ON and OFF timings of each dispatchable load which 
will help in pre-analysis and eventually support in coping this problem. Moreover, since last decade, the load 
scheduling has been one of the major area of research and development for the aggregators. The aggregator has 
to develop an optimal control strategy for load scheduling that enables it to manage and satisfy the consumers as 
well as efficiently achieve the business functions i.e. Respond quickly to Utility’s requirement for power 
curtailment and Make profit out of this service. 
7. Conclusion 
The integration of domestic and industrial consumers under Direct Load Control Program with Demand 
Reduction Bidding Mechanism will help the grid in coping the demand peak during peak hours. On the other 
hand, the utilities and energy regulatory bodies have a new player to do business with i.e. the Aggregator. The 
aggregators are the key third party agents for implementation of the proposed framework of DLC with DRB to 
be successful. By signing the contracts, they have the potential to make revenue of this service. Future work 
include the design of consumer selection techniques to optimize the proposed functions of the aggregator. The 
major obstacle in the implementation of this program are initial investment, consumer awareness and willingness 
and government policies and strategies. Thus, the key players which include Government, Regulators and 
Appliance Manufactures should take measures to materialize this concept of aggregation. 
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